Decompiling FlatBuffers case study: Facebook's GraphQL schema
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Background
Back in 2017, while looking for an open-source client for Facebook's Messenger, I stumbled upon fbchat. A project that implements an open-source interface for Facebook's Messenger. Knowing full-well that Facebook did not officially expose that interface for user-to-user communication, I became intrigued. From what I knew from libpurple's it would have had to use MQTT, but it was not the case. This implementation used a REST based API, digging through the source-code I found out it used a version of the GraphQL API.
After digging a bit on the internet I realised that there existed no public documentation of this particular API. Except perhaps, the occasional blog-post about a few fields or methods. And of course, what the fbchat project managed to dig-up.
Source code for the provided files and a decoded schema can be found at: fb-graphql-schema
The first step is the hardest
But API interfaces must be known publicly, at least by the clients of those APIs. And here begins our journey. And its first task, find a client for Facebook's GraphQL API. An easy task you say? Given that we all know about the Facebook for Android and Messenger apps, even Facebook Lite, it should be easy. Unfortunately not, we do not know in what format the schema is stored, it could be compressed, obfuscated, it might exist only as byte code.
And we have one more problem, how do we find it? This problem we can answer, at least by a simple heuristic, the schema must contain the type and field names. Fortunately for us some of them have already been provided by the fbchat project. We end up with a string search through Facebook's apps. Sample GraphQL queries can be found at _graphql.py
I'm more familiar with Android so that was my platform of choice. My first try was Facebook Lite, but I had no success. Next up, Facebook for Android(aka com.facebook.katana). The version we are going to discuss is v230.0.0.36.117 , given that I revisited the schema in 2019.
In this case apktool d -r gave me a decent start. The -r flag is needed due to a bug in apktool. It disables the extraction of resources, but it won't affect the discussion.
Now, we can start looking for strings. We'll need a sufficiently uncommon string so that it doesn't match too many files, long ones are generally the best. So let's try grep -R lightweight_event_creator. And more sure than not, we get:
grep: assets/graph_metadata.bin: binary file matches
Given the suggestively named file, we have found our schema!
Magic numbers
I was expecting a few months of dex reverse engineering, but the task seems to be a different one. We now have to deduce the file-type. Let's try:
$ file assets/graph_metadata.bin
assets/graph_metadata.bin: data
So it's a custom encoding, it might be ASN.1, a proprietary serialization, or anything else. This file must be read somewhere, so we might find a reference to it and hopefully to its format:
$ grep -R graph_metadata.bin
original/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF:Name: assets/graph_metadata.bin
original/META-INF/FACEBOOK.SF:Name: assets/graph_metadata.bin
Nothing useful... the code could be obfuscated or downloaded from the internet. An Android installation might provide us with more information. Let's find out where it's used:
$ adb root
$ adb shell
generic_arm64:/ # setenforce 0
generic_arm64:/ # stop
generic_arm64:/ # start
generic_arm64:/ # strace -ff -i -s 500 -o /data/local/tmp/strace.zygote -p $(pidof zygote)
generic_arm64:/ # grep -R graph_metadata.bin /data/local/tmp/strace.zygote.*
strace.zygote.6690:[e893a7ac] pread64(31, "assets/graph_metadata.bin", 25, 5584953) = 25
And in this case we got nothing, or maybe. But it's not an open, nor an openat. We have an offset let's check that with the apk:
$ grep -abo assets/graph_metadata.bin katana.apk
5584953:assets/graph_metadata.bin
41145638:assets/graph_metadata.bin
So, it's there, we now have a hint to tell gdb what condition to break on:
$ adb forward tcp:4444 tcp:4444
$ adb shell
generic_arm64:/ # am set-debug-app com.facebook.katana
generic_arm64:/ # setprop wrap.com.facebook.katana 'gdbserver localhost:4444'
Now we'll open Facebook for Android and launch gdb:
$ gdb
target remote :4444
break pread64
condition 1 $r4 == 5584953
And...
#0 0xf5b567a4 in pread64 () from target:/system/lib/libc.so [36/1861]
#1 0xf6a768d8 in ?? () from target:/system/lib/libandroidfw.so
#2 0xf6a73190 in android::ZipFileRO::findEntryByName(char const*) const () from target:/system/lib/libandroidfw.so
#3 0xf6a65664 in android::AssetManager::openNonAssetInPathLocked(char const*, android::Asset::AccessMode, android::AssetManager::asset_path const&
) () from target:/system/lib/libandroidfw.so
#4 0xf6a65bd6 in android::AssetManager::open(char const*, android::Asset::AccessMode) () from target:/system/lib/libandroidfw.so
#5 0xf753c79e in AAssetManager_open () from target:/system/lib/libandroid.so
#6 0xda7f928a in ?? () from target:/data/data/com.facebook.katana/lib-xzs/libcoldstart.so
#7 0xda7f91ec in ?? () from target:/data/data/com.facebook.katana/lib-xzs/libcoldstart.so
#8 0xda7f9160 in ?? () from target:/data/data/com.facebook.katana/lib-xzs/libcoldstart.so
#9 0xda815bf0 in ?? () from target:/data/data/com.facebook.katana/lib-xzs/libcoldstart.so
#10 0xda6efece in ?? () from target:/data/data/com.facebook.katana/lib-xzs/libcoldstart.so
#11 0xda6f2186 in ?? () from target:/data/data/com.facebook.katana/lib-xzs/libcoldstart.so
#12 0xda6f2012 in ?? () from target:/data/data/com.facebook.katana/lib-xzs/libcoldstart.so
Looks like it's somewhere in libcoldstart.so. Let's see if we can find its format. Maybe we can get some information by looking at the libraries it links to?
$ adb pull /data/data/com.facebook.katana/lib-xzs/libcoldstart.so
$ readelf -a libcoldstart.so | grep 'Shared library:'
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libz.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libdl.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [liblowlevel.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libxplat_yoga_util_utilAndroid.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [liblog.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libandroid.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libxplat_third-party_jsoncpp_jsoncppAndroid.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libglog.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libfmt.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libflatbuffersflatc.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libsigmux.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libfbsystrace.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libmemalign16.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libbreakpad.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libprofiloextapi.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [liblinkerutilsmerged.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libdistractmerged.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libgnustl_shared.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libm.so]
0x00000001 (NEEDED) Shared library: [libc.so]
Now we have a reference to FlatBuffers: "libflatbuffersflatc.so", could this be the format? Let's check. An easy way to see if a file is formated using FlatBuffers is to check that the first 4 bytes interpreted as an int32_t point to a table, the first int32_t in a table is the negative offset to its virtual table. Let's see:
$ hexdump -C graph_metadata.bin | head
00000000 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 16 00 28 00 04 00 | ...........(...|
00000010 08 00 0c 00 10 00 14 00 18 00 1c 00 20 00 24 00 |............ .$.|
00000020 16 00 00 00 e0 10 2f 00 10 27 25 00 04 3a 1f 00 |....../..'%..:..|
00000030 20 fd 1d 00 ac 96 13 00 94 96 13 00 68 12 13 00 | ...........h...|
00000040 b4 0e 0b 00 04 00 00 00 64 52 00 00 a0 0e 0b 00 |........dR......|
00000050 90 0e 0b 00 84 0e 0b 00 78 0e 0b 00 68 0e 0b 00 |........x...h...|
00000060 4c 0e 0b 00 28 0e 0b 00 08 0e 0b 00 e4 0d 0b 00 |L...(...........|
00000070 c8 0d 0b 00 ac 0d 0b 00 94 0d 0b 00 84 0d 0b 00 |................|
00000080 68 0d 0b 00 58 0d 0b 00 40 0d 0b 00 24 0d 0b 00 |h...X...@...$...|
00000090 08 0d 0b 00 f0 0c 0b 00 d8 0c 0b 00 c0 0c 0b 00 |................|
Integers in FlatBuffers are little-endian. We get: The first offset is 0x20 , it points to a 0x16 which points to the (0x16, 0x28). Assuming that 0x16 is the length of the virtual table, the data immediately after it is our root table. It would seem that it passes this heuristic.
Decoding
To automatize the decoding process, I have written a python module:
$ echo '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' | base64 -d | gunzip >fbs.py
Running:
>>> import fbs
>>> data = open('graph_schema.bin', 'rb').read()
>>> root = root = fbs.deref_offset(data, 00)
>>> fbs.get_table_vt(data, root)
{'vt_len': 22, 'tbl_len': 40, 'entries': (4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, 36)}
From here it's a lot of guess work, and trial and error. So far I've got the following schema, it's incomplete, but it provides us with enough information to reconstruct all types and fields of the GraphQL API:
echo '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' | base64 -d | gunzip >graph_metadata.fbs
The final step
The schema as you've probably noticed has an extra layer of encoding, probably to reduce its size. We don't know what the types nor fields mean. The most helpful indicator is that if the type of a field is a short we can check if it's an index in a vector by checking that all values are less than the vector's length and the maximum index is close to the length of the vector.
We'll skip over the manual decoding. I'll just show you the script I wrote to extract the types from the schema:
echo 'H4sIAAAAAAACA5VUwW7CMAy95ysy7ZAiVWUUmLRJXHfcD1RR1NEUytqkSgJShfbvc+KWFhiH9RTe87Of7YTnp/nRmvlXpeZSnWjbub1WS0KqptXG0YPVajjbzhJCClnSrVYnaZwoK1kX0aGI6S4cZ++EwqfyRtINPRQZK98Yz5DM2MdKlAvGOQlRZQoxUyplHInlDbFkvaQqPVkpmr3EdMGxmv92rmsvJddQskw5aNehXoiS9ShexXQd09dH+jfU35ZcgOoPCcvOP5wlpTZN7qKAzlBqpDsaRc8XCfODYe9hPvGIegmgQYrwz82cPYNjDumvphygsdfBdABS5p2HiNF4a6omN534lt3Q8covacyT+h39HX6/+Qnf9y1r+7Dcp1ayX7/PYAHK+q1rg9jFMpqB5Y/JMGDiOgD8jr+3iffzOtAmedtKVUQ9+a+tTfoCcvJrEoNVgMbD9XKbvFJQWfXrhBMY1+DHgzFlxjH0ewgdw0NMap0XQYJW7XYvm/x6hHgtIdfwFO5v7INbdYnDtMNspjc6mCiOTRthTOz/ExLrCn10s2GtKtnW2soIAAIXUQg/OCHoBt6KEL5rIRi6CiPwKXKzO2ULPiO/Stbkt48EAAA=' | base64 -d | gunzip >schema.py
flatc --json --strict-json --raw-binary graph_metadata.fbs -- graphql_schema.bin
./schema.py graphql_schema.json >graphql_types.json
And, we're done.
Disclosure
I have presented my findings to Facebook, their response was that the schema is not confidential.
from Hacker News https://ift.tt/3gtovEE
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